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Litigation privilege: transient or
timeless? Blank v Canada (Minister
of Justice)
By James Goudkamp*
Visiting Fellow, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong
Oitigation privilege has become unfashionable. It is under attack on
multiple fronts throughout the common law world! In the United
Kingdom, perhaps the most notable inroad on the privilege is that made
by the House of Lords in Re L (A Minor) (Police Investigation: Privilege).2 In that case it
was held that the privilege is an incident of adversarial proceedings and that,
consequently, it did not obtain in respect of material generated for the purposes of
proceedings that were not predominantly adversarial in nature. There are signs
that more radical restrictions are to come. In Three Rivers District Council v Governor
and Company of the Bank of England (No. 6) Lord Scott of Foscote foreshadowed that a
fundamental reconsideration of litigation privilege may be necessary?
In Australia, the Federal Court inAAWB Ltd v Cole followed the decision of the House
of Lords in Re L and held that documents brought into existence for the purposes
of proceedings before a Royal Commission do not attract the privilege as such
proceedings lack some of the central features of adversarial litigation.' Another
notable development is the lifting of the privilege from experts' reports in
Queensland 5 and South Australia.6 It seems that further incursions into litigation
Email: james.goudkamp@magd.ox.ac.uk. The author is grateflul to Professor Adrian Zuckerman
and Roderick Bagshaw for their helpful comments on a draft of this case note.
1 See Richard Mahoney, 'Reforming Litigation Privilege' (2001) 30 Common Law World Review 66 at
69-76.
2 [1997] AC 16.
3 [2005] 1 AC 610 at [29]; cf. at [53],per Lord Rodger of Earlsferry.
4 (2006) 152 FCR 382 at [158]-[164].
5 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r. 212(2) (see Parr vBavarian Steak House Pty Ltd [2001] 2 Qd
R 196; Mitchell Contractors Py Ltd v Townsville-Thuringowa Water SupplyJoint Board [2005] 1 Qd R 373).
6 Supreme Court Rules 2006 (SA), r. 160(1). In the United Kingdom, Lord Woolf, in his Interim Report
on Access to Justice, recommended removing litigation privilege from communications with
experts (Access to Justice: Interipn Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in England and
Wales, Recommendation 108 (HMSO: 1995)). This recommendation received a predictably hostile
response from the profession and was dropped (see Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor
on the CivilJustice System in England and Wales, [13.31]-[13.32] (HMSO: 1996). However, a small dent in
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privilege are likely. The Federal Government, concerned that legal professional
privilege is unduly hampering investigative and regulatory bodies, has recently
requested the Australian Law Reform Commission to advise as to the desirability
of augmenting existing statutory exceptions to the privilege.14
In Canada, litigation privilege has come under heavy fire. Contraiy to the position
adopted by the House of Lords and the High Court of Australia, the Supreme Court
has held that neither litigation privilege nor legal advice privilege is absolute and
that both will be subordinated to the interest of permitting an accused to make a
full answer and defence.8 Similarly, the Supreme Court, in its important decision
in Blank v Canada (Minister of Justice),9 held that litigation privilege does not persist
indefinitely but withers when the proceedings that gave rise to it and any related
proceedings are complete."
The decision in Blank has been the subject of a previous note in this journal ' The
authors of that note remarked that the decision was relatively uncontroversial.
Indeed it was. In Canada, the weight of authority supported that holding."'
However, a decision to the same effect in many other jurisdictions would be
regarded as a landmark in the law of evidence. In the United Kingdom and
Australia, for instance, once a document or communication attracts litigation
privilege, it is privileged in perpetuity, subject to the possibility of waiver. As Lord
Lindley MR famously remarked in Caicraft v Guest, the general rule is 'once privi-
leged always privileged'. 3 It is irrelevant that the action in respect of which the
privilege arose has been completed: the 'privilege attaches for all time'4 It is also
immaterial that the privileged material was prepared in anticipation of litigation
the privilege was made in CPR r. 35.10(3). This provision states that experts must set out their
instructions in their reports. CPR r. 35.10(4) provides that if reasonable grounds exist for believing
that an expert has failed to comply with this duty the expert maybe cross-examined as to his or her
instructions.
7 See ALRC, Client Legal Privilege and Federal Investigatory Bodies, IP No. 33 (2007).
8 R v McClure [2001] 1 SCR 445. Contra R v Derby Magistrates' Court, ex p. B [1996] AC 487 and Carter v
Managing Partner of Nortbnore Hale Davy & Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121. Although see Evidence Act 1995
(Cth, NSW and Tas), s. 123.
9 [2006] 2 SCR 319.
10 It is arguable that the same position prevails in New Zealand: R v Craig [1975] 1 NZLR 597 at 599;
Evidence Act 2006 (NZ), s. 56.
11 Dale Ives and Stephen Pitel, 'Filling in the Blanks for Litigation Privilege: Blank v Canada (Minister of
Justice)' (2007) 11 E & P 49.
12 See the authorities referred to in Blank [2006] 2 SCR 319 at [36].
13 [1898] 1 QB 759 at 761. See also Bullock v Cary (1878) 3 QBD 356 at 358-9.
14 Hobbs v Hobbs and Cousens [1960] P 112 at 116.
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that never took place.15 Nor does it matter that the client has died." The privilege
will continue for the benefit of the client's successors in title.
Considering the current hostile attitude towards litigation privilege, it seems
likely that English courts will be called upon to reconsider the duration of
litigation privilege in the near future. Accordingly, it is worth grappling with the
arguments for and against abrogating the 'once privileged always privileged' rule.
It will be argued that the modification of this rule wrought by the Supreme Court
of Canada in Blank is a positive development. However, it should be observed that
if such an adjustment were made in England, it would be insufficient to remove
concerns17 as to the compatibility of litigation privilege with Article 6 of the
European Convention on Human Rights. Al attempt will be made to explain why
this is so.
The facts in Blank
The salient facts in Blank can be stated within a short compass. Mr Blank and a
company that he controlled were charged with pollution offences and failing to
report to regulatory authorities. All of the charges were ultimately either quashed
or stayed. Mr Blank and the company subsequently brought proceedings against
the Federal Government of Canada alleging fraud, abuse of process and other
wrongs. For the purposes of these proceedings, Mr Blank sought access to certain
government records." The Government withheld some of these records on the
grounds of litigation privilege.
The decision of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Canada, affirming the decisions of the courts below, 9 held
that the privilege enjoyed by the Government had been extinguished upon the
conclusion of the criminal proceedings. As readers will be familiar with the
Supreme Court's reasoning there is no need to examine it in detail. In short, the
court's conclusion rests upon the differences between legal advice privilege and
litigation privilege. Fish J, who delivered the principal reasons, observed that these
two species of privilege are driven by different policy considerations. Legal advice
privilege is aimed at ensuring that litigants are not discouraged from seeking
15 Pearce v Foster (1885) 15 QBD 114.
16 BullivantvA ttonev-General forV ictoria [1901]AC 196 at 206; cf. T. Neoh and A. Eu, 'The Duration of a
Claim of Legal Professional Privilege' (1982) 12 Hong Kong Law Review 66.
17 See e.g. Gavin Murphy, 'The Innocence at Stake Test and Legal Professional Privilege: A Logical
Progression for the Law ... But Not in England' [2001] Crim LR 728.
18 The contents of these documents remain unknown.
19 Blank v Canada (Departmenit ofJnstice) [2003] FCT 462; Blank v Canada (Departrnent ofJus~tce) [2005] 1 FCR
403.
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advice about the law.2 Litigation privilege is concerned with the efficacy of the
adversarial process. 1 It is thought that, without litigation privilege, litigants
would be hindered in their preparations for litigation by a fear that their adver-
saries could benefit from the fruits of their work. Its purpose is to create a 'zone of
privacy'2 in relation to preparations for contemplated or pending litigation. With
this difference in mind, Fish J reasoned that the rationale for litigation privilege
ordinarily disappears when the proceedings that gave birth to it have drawn to an
end. Consequently, it was held that, as a general rule, the privilege should only
continue for the duration of the litigation from whence it sprung."
Importantly, however, Fish J perceived a need to extend the protection of
litigation privilege beyond the proceedings which gave rise to it in circumstances
where a litigant could be discouraged from properly preparing for extant
litigation out of a concern for his prospects of success in related litigation. He
defined 'related litigation' expansively. He asserted that 'at a minimum' it entails
(1) 'separate proceedings that involve the same or related parties [that] arise from
the same or a related cause of action (or "juridical source")' and (2) '[p]roceedings
that raise issues in common to the initial action and share its essential purpose'.
Commentary
There is a range of positions that the courts could take in relation to the duration
of litigation privilege. At one end of the spectrum, the privilege could expire upon
the conclusion of the litigation that gave rise to it. At the other end, the privilege
could continue indefinitely (as in England). The intermediate position is for the
privilege to continue after the litigation that generated it is complete if related
litigation is pending or anticipated (as in Canada). Obviously, 'related litigation'
could be defined broadly or narrowly. The more liberal the definition, the more
resilient the privilege is likely to be.
If one believes that litigants should enjoy a litigation privilege in respect of
documents generated for the purposes of proceedings in which they are presently
embroiled, it is plainly very difficult to defend the position that the privilege
should lapse upon the finalisation of the litigation that generated it. If litigants
are liable to be discouraged from preparing for pending litigation out of a concern
that their adversaries could benefit from those preparations, it is surely the case
20 Blank [2006] 2 SCR 319 at [26].
21 Ibid. at [27].
22 Ibid. at [32], [34].
23 Ibid. at [34]-[36].
24 Ibid. at [39].
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that they may also be discouraged by the possibility that their preparations could
hinder their prospects of success in related litigation, especially where related
litigation is likely.
The choice, therefore, is essentially between the 'once privileged always privi-
leged' rule and the intermediate position. In support of the intermediate
position is the decision in Blank and Fish J's intuition that lifting the privilege
where the litigation that gave birth to it and any related litigation has come to
an end would not unduly inhibit preparations for litigation. Obviously, however,
it can be contested whether Fish J's assumption about litigant behaviour is
correct. Consider, for example, the following argument advanced by Brennan J
in the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Federal Trade Commis-
sioners v Grolier Inc. against circumscribing the duration of work product
immunity:
21
... disclosure of work product connected to prior litigation can cause
real harm to the interests of the attorney and his client even after the
controversy in the prior litigation is resolved. Many government
agencies, for example, deal with hundreds or thousands of essentially
similar cases in which they must decide whether and how to conduct
enforcement litigation. Few of these cases will be 'related' to each
other in the sense of involving the same private parties or arising out
of the same set of historical facts; yet large classes of them may
present recurring, parallel factual settings and identical legal and
policy considerations. It would be of substantial benefit to an
opposing party (and of corresponding detriment to an agency) if the
party could obtain work product generated by the agency in
connection with earlier, similar litigation against other persons. He
would get the benefit of the agency's legal and factual research and
reasoning, enabling him to litigate on wits borrowed from the
adversary. Worse yet, he could gain insight into the agency's general
strategic and tactical approach to deciding when suits are brought,
how they are conducted, and on what terms they may be settled. Nor
is the problem limited to government agencies. Any litigants who face
25 462 US 19 (1983) at 30-1 (citations omitted). Work product immunity is the functional equivalent
of litigation privilege. An important difference, however, is that unlike litigation privilege, the
immunity is not absolute. It may be lifted 'upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means' (see
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 26(b)(3)).
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litigation of a commonly recurring type ... have an acute interest in
keeping private the matter in which they conduct and settle their
recurring legal disputes.
It is suggested that whether Fish J or Brennan J is correct about the relationship
between the privilege and litigant behaviour is a matter that cannot be confi-
dently determined in the abstract. Empirical data are needed to settle the issue of
whether placing a temporal limitation on litigation privilege would have a
chilling effect on preparations for litigation. However, in this author's view, it is
unlikely that the derogation from the 'once privileged always privileged' rule
effected by Blank would discourage preparations for litigation.26 Because this
derogation is relatively minor due to the broad definition of 'related litigation',
most litigants would brush aside the risk that their preparations would come back
to bite them. This is particularly so when it is remembered that even if litigation
privilege has been lost, the material in issue may be subject to legal advice
privilege.
There is, however, another argument, unrelated to litigant behaviour, in support
of the 'once privileged always privileged' rule that is worth briefly examining. As
the rule reduces the probability of privileged material that casts doubt upon the
rectitude of decisions coming to light, it might be argued that, because the
revelation of such material is liable to have a deleterious effect on public confi-
dence in the law, the rule is justified. There are several grounds for rejecting this
argument. First, considering that our system of judicial adjudication is largely
concerned with discovering the truth, it is odd to say that the truth can hurt.
Secondly, the argument is self-defeating. If it became known that the truth was
being concealed simply to promote the appearance of accurate verdicts, confi-
dence in the law would be j eopardised. Thirdly, this argument cannot explain why
facilities exist for reopening decisions, in both the civil and criminal contexts,
where fresh evidence has emerged.
In the absence of a plainly sound ground for maintaining the 'once privileged
always privileged' rule it follows that the curtailment of that rule by the decision
in Blank is a step forwards. However, it should be observed that were Blank followed
in England, doubts as to the compatibility of litigation privilege with Article 6
would not be removed. The concern is that litigation privilege (and legal advice
privilege) may infringe the right to a fair trial as the privilege is inviolate
regardless of the need for the privileged material in a specific case and irrespective
26 See also Rosemary Pattenden, 'Litigation Privilege and Expert Opinion Evidence' (2000) 4 E & P 213
at 221.
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of whether the individual entitled to the privilege would suffer any adverse conse-
quences as a result of its removal. Imposing a limitation on the duration of
litigation privilege would not address this concern. For instance, whether the
privilege has been exhausted under the Blank formulation turns on the
mechanical question of whether the relevant litigation and any related litigation
is complete. This formulation is insensitive to impact of the privilege on the
fairness of proceedings in individual cases. In particular, it does not necessarily
allow defendants in criminal proceedings to invade the privilege where the privi-
leged material may cast reasonable doubt upon their guilt and the party entitled
to the privilege would not be disadvantaged by its loss.
Conclusion
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Blank conforms to the general
trend of reining in litigation privilege. The courts in other jurisdictions will doubt-
lessly be tempted to follow the Supreme Court's lead and reconsider the 'once
privileged always privileged' rule. However, it should not be thought that
embracing such a restriction would remove concerns about the compatibility of
litigation privilege with Article 6. The restriction developed by the Supreme Court
does not engage with the fairness of recognising the privilege within the four
corners of individual cases. Examining the privilege in this way is, however,
essential to determining whether the privilege is a disproportionate restriction on
the right to a fair trial.
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